D between these processes, allowing pre-activation through priming, but not predictive

D between these processes, allowing get PF-04418948 pre-PF-04418948 custom synthesis activation through priming, but not predictive pre-activation, to influence processing of new bottom-up input. Unlike predictive pre-activation, which entailed the use of high level information within the internal representation of context to pre-activate upcoming information at lower level(s) of representation, priming was assumed to stem from lower level information that was retained with the comprehender’s internal representation of context in a relatively raw form. The assumption was that this lingering lower level information might pre-activate upcoming information at this same lower level, through mechanisms such as spreading activation (e.g. Forster, 1981; see also Fodor, 1983).9 Priming was therefore often viewed as non-targeted (in that activation was taken to spread indiscriminately to related nodes at a single level of representation), and short-term (in that any lingering activation from processing of previous material was assumed to decay rapidly). Some researchers also assumed other differences between priming and predictive preactivation. For example, priming was often taken to be non-strategic (in that it serves no purpose), automatic (in that it occurs without conscious control), and sometimes even involuntary (in that it cannot be suppressed). This was again taken to be different from predictive pre-activation, which as noted in section 1, was originally believed to be strategic and sometimes targeted in that only one or a few highly probable candidates were taken to be predicted (Becker, 1980, 1985; Forster, 1981; Neely, Keefe, Ross, 1989; Posner Snyder, 1975). A problem with interpreting this literature, however, is that not every account that appealed to priming subscribed to all of these assumptions, and exactly what distinguished preactivation through priming from predictive pre-activation was not always made explicit. Moreover, there has sometimes been a tendency to hold on to some older assumptions about both priming and predictive pre-activation. For example, as discussed in section 1, prediction is no longer assumed to be strategic or all-or-nothing, but rather implicit and probabilistic in nature (e.g. DeLong et al., 2005; Federmeier Kutas, 1999), and there is also evidence that even `automatic’ priming can sometimes be subject to some strategic control (e.g., Hutchison, 2007).Author Manuscript Author Manuscript Author Manuscript Author Manuscript8The term, priming, is sometimes used simply to describe the phenomenon of facilitated processing of a target that is preceded by a prime, with which it shares one or more representation(s), regardless of mechanism. Pre-activation is just one of these mechanisms. For example, multiple different mechanisms have been proposed to account for the phenomena of both semantic priming (see Neely, 1991 for a review) and syntactic priming (e.g. Chang, Dell, Bock, 2006; Jaeger Snider, 2013; Tooley Traxler, 2010). 9For example, memory-based models of text processing assumed that simple lexico-semantic relationships within the internal representation of context, approximating to a `bag of words’ (quantified using measures like Latent Semantic Analysis, Kintsch, 2001; Landauer Dumais, 1997; Landauer, Foltz, Laham, 1998), could interact with lexico-semantic relationships stored within longterm memory, and prime upcoming lexico-semantic information through spreading activation (Kintsch, 1988; McKoon Ratcliff, 1992; Myers O’.D between these processes, allowing pre-activation through priming, but not predictive pre-activation, to influence processing of new bottom-up input. Unlike predictive pre-activation, which entailed the use of high level information within the internal representation of context to pre-activate upcoming information at lower level(s) of representation, priming was assumed to stem from lower level information that was retained with the comprehender’s internal representation of context in a relatively raw form. The assumption was that this lingering lower level information might pre-activate upcoming information at this same lower level, through mechanisms such as spreading activation (e.g. Forster, 1981; see also Fodor, 1983).9 Priming was therefore often viewed as non-targeted (in that activation was taken to spread indiscriminately to related nodes at a single level of representation), and short-term (in that any lingering activation from processing of previous material was assumed to decay rapidly). Some researchers also assumed other differences between priming and predictive preactivation. For example, priming was often taken to be non-strategic (in that it serves no purpose), automatic (in that it occurs without conscious control), and sometimes even involuntary (in that it cannot be suppressed). This was again taken to be different from predictive pre-activation, which as noted in section 1, was originally believed to be strategic and sometimes targeted in that only one or a few highly probable candidates were taken to be predicted (Becker, 1980, 1985; Forster, 1981; Neely, Keefe, Ross, 1989; Posner Snyder, 1975). A problem with interpreting this literature, however, is that not every account that appealed to priming subscribed to all of these assumptions, and exactly what distinguished preactivation through priming from predictive pre-activation was not always made explicit. Moreover, there has sometimes been a tendency to hold on to some older assumptions about both priming and predictive pre-activation. For example, as discussed in section 1, prediction is no longer assumed to be strategic or all-or-nothing, but rather implicit and probabilistic in nature (e.g. DeLong et al., 2005; Federmeier Kutas, 1999), and there is also evidence that even `automatic’ priming can sometimes be subject to some strategic control (e.g., Hutchison, 2007).Author Manuscript Author Manuscript Author Manuscript Author Manuscript8The term, priming, is sometimes used simply to describe the phenomenon of facilitated processing of a target that is preceded by a prime, with which it shares one or more representation(s), regardless of mechanism. Pre-activation is just one of these mechanisms. For example, multiple different mechanisms have been proposed to account for the phenomena of both semantic priming (see Neely, 1991 for a review) and syntactic priming (e.g. Chang, Dell, Bock, 2006; Jaeger Snider, 2013; Tooley Traxler, 2010). 9For example, memory-based models of text processing assumed that simple lexico-semantic relationships within the internal representation of context, approximating to a `bag of words’ (quantified using measures like Latent Semantic Analysis, Kintsch, 2001; Landauer Dumais, 1997; Landauer, Foltz, Laham, 1998), could interact with lexico-semantic relationships stored within longterm memory, and prime upcoming lexico-semantic information through spreading activation (Kintsch, 1988; McKoon Ratcliff, 1992; Myers O’.